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Abstract
Channel contract relations are dynamic. In this paper, it is argued that one of the drivers for this dynamism is a firm’s strive for
shareholder value. Using channel contract relationships as market-based assets, firms are managing a portfolio of spot and forward contract
relationships. By exclusively focusing on the cash flow consequences of contract relationships, in the context of an industrial marketing
channel, we introduce a decision-oriented, normative, multichannel dyadic model that shows how channel contract relationships interact,
thereby explaining the various contract relationships that exist and the dynamics within these relationships. The model transforms top
management’s financial objectives into marketing management decisions and guides the decision process of channel members in optimizing
the cash flow consequences of channel contract relationships. The properties of the model are illustrated for the meat departments of
European retailers.
D 2002 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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‘‘Good financial analysis complements rather than con-
tradicts good marketing analysis.’’ (Barwise et al., 1989,
p. 85)
1. Introduction
The increasing globalization of marketing channels has
resulted in more volatility in companies’ cash flows (e.g.,
Fellman, 1998; McCallum, 1999). Rappaport (1986) and
Srivastava et al. (1998, 1999) have shown that cash flow
volatility has a direct relationship to the creation of share-
holder value. Managers of large companies increasingly use
the creation of shareholder value as a yardstick of perform-
ance (Day and Fahey, 1999; Srivastava et al., 1998, 1999).
Shareholder value can be thought of as a forecast cash flow,
discounted by the risk-adjusted cost of capital (Benninga
and Sarig, 1997; Leland, 1998). Rappaport (1986) and
Srivastava et al. (1998, 1999) show that reducing the risk
associated with cash flows is one of the drivers of creating
shareholder value. A decrease in cash flow volatility will
decrease the firm’s cost of capital and hence enhance
shareholder value. That is, more stable cash flows generate
higher net present values and hence more shareholder value
(Christie and Nanda, 1994).
One way to deal with the volatility of cash flows is
through channel relationship management. Srivastava et al.
(1998) argued that the volatility of cash flows is reduced
when the firm’s relationship with its customers and channel
partners is arranged in a manner that promotes stability in
operations. Hence, channel relationship management may
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to its cash flow consequences (Anderson, 1982; Bernstein,
1996). This is especially true for internationally operating
firms that have various channel relationships with different
companies abroad.
The relationships that a firm establishes often differ per
channel party. That is, a firm has a whole portfolio of
channel relationships across goods and services, across
purchases and sales, and across regions or countries. This
portfolio of channel contract relationships yields the firm’s
total net cash flow, where ‘total net cash flow’ is defined as
all cash flows generated by sales contract relationships
minus all cash flows generated by purchase contract rela-
tionships. The total net cash flow and its volatility make up
the firm’s contribution to shareholder value. This means
that firms must monitor all cash flow streams, particularly
the relation between them, in order to come up with
‘‘optimal’’ channel relationship strategies. In this paper,
‘‘optimal’’ refers to the optimal risk–return trade-off that
channel members make assuming that this is their only
objective. Other objectives, such as creating long-term
channel relationship are not captured in our definition of
optimal.
We introduce a multichannel dyadic contract model that
simultaneously accounts for all cash flow consequences that
channel contract relationships generate. The model focuses
exclusively on the cash flow consequences of channel
contracts. Other important elements of channel relation-
ships, such as trust, commitment, and power are not dealt
with (e.g., Gundlach and Cadotte, 1994; Kumar et al.,
1995).
Channel relationship decisions are described in terms of
the type of contract used by the channel members. The
model’s purpose is to show how channel contract relation-
ships interact, thereby explaining the various existing
contract relationships and the dynamics in them. The term
‘‘interact’’ refers, in this paper, to the situation that contract
relationships with suppliers influence the channel member’s
contract relationships with buyers and vice versa, and the
term ‘‘dynamics’’ refers to changes in the type of contract
relationships. The model provides normative guidance to
channel members that make decisions regarding their
contractual relationships with customers and suppliers.
The model is decision-oriented and guides channel mem-
bers in designing their contractual relationships with other
channel members when their only objective is to maximize
their risk–return trade-off, i.e., enhancing shareholder
value.
We start with a brief background on managing volatile
cash flows in marketing channels. Thereafter, we introduce
the multichannel dyadic contract model that yields the
channel member’s optimal combination of channel contract
relationships. We illustrate the model, using data from the
meat-marketing channels of retailers in six European coun-
tries: France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and
the United Kingdom.
2. Managing cash flow volatility in channel relationships
Channel relationship management requires marketing
managers to determine the different aspects of channel
contract relationships. Channel contract relationships are
complex, as they capture different dimensions. In the
channel literature, the dimensions of trust, commitment,
and power, among others, are extensively investigated
(e.g., Geyskens et al., 1999). In this paper, we exclusively
focus on the cash flow dimension of channel contracts, as
this dimension relates marketing activities directly to the
financial performance of the channel member. Marketing
managers must determine the degree of cash flow volatility
in each part of the channel and assess the ability and
willingness of other channel members to cope with cash
flow volatility. Channel contracts can be used to redistribute
cash flow volatility (Lusch and Brown, 1996). In order to
examine how channel behavior translates into the financial
performance of channel members, we have to focus on the
cash flow consequences of channel contracts. Following
Jackson (1980), we distinguish two broad classes of con-
tracts based on their cash flow consequences: spot contracts
and forward contracts. Spot contracts define the price at the
moment of the transaction (time t+1), based on the spot
market, not at the channel member’s decision moment (time
t). Cash flows resulting from such contracts are uncertain at
the moment the contract is initiated. Spot market buys
(sales) are common at, for example, fruit and vegetable
auctions for retailers. Forward contracts, on the other hand,
fix the price at the moment the contract is initiated (time t),
and, hence, the cash flow generated at the time of actual
delivery (at time t+1) is certain and, as a result, may
contribute to shareholder value. Thus, a forward contract
is able to reduce the volatility of cash flows between
channel members (e.g., Crocker and Masten, 1991). In the
remainder of this paper, we use the term ‘‘channel contract
relationships’’ when talking about the cash flow consequen-
ces of channel contract relationship. Hence, our definition of
channel contract relationship refers only to one dimension
of the contract: the cash flow consequence, neglecting other
important dimensions such as trust and interdependence.
Previous studies on market transactions have highlighted
the dyadic relationship between two parties (e.g., Bonoma et
al., 1978; Achrol et al., 1983; Anderson and Weitz, 1989;
Curry et al., 1991; Iacobucci and Hopkins, 1992). The
dyadic perspective provides insight into a particular
exchange relationship between two channel members, as it
explicitly takes both channel members’ behavior into
account. We extend this approach, such that extradyadic
influences can be analyzed, that is, how one change in a
firm’s channel relationship triggers another in another chan-
nel relationship. In this paper, we show that a contract with
an upstream (downstream) channel member influences the
channel member’s contract behavior with other upstream
(downstream) channel members. Furthermore, we show that
a contract with an upstream channel member influences the
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nel members and vice versa. This interaction between
channel decisions among different channel parties is driven
by the fact that channel members wish to optimize the trade-
off between the total net cash flow (which equals the result
of all channel relationships) and its volatility. Therefore, we
study the channel member’s contract relationships with
upstream channel members (e.g., customers), as well as
his/her contract relationships with downstream channel
members (e.g., suppliers).
In Section 3, we propose a multichannel dyadic contract
model that includes all cash flow consequences resulting
from the various channel contract relationships. The model
is theoretically rooted in economics and marketing (e.g.,
Pratt, 1964; Arrow, 1971; Tsiang, 1972, 1974; Hirshleifer,
1988; Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997).
3. A multichannel dyadic model
Following the work on the expected utility model, we
assume that the objective of a channel member is to
maximize the expected utility of the net cash flows (cf.
Baron, 1979; Schoemaker, 1982; Nielsen, 1987; Meyer,
1987; Meyer and Rasche, 1992; Bateman et al., 1988;
Epstein and Zin, 1989). The expected utility equals the
expected total net cash flow adjusted for the volatility (e.g.,
creation of shareholder value) and can be given by:
U ¼ EðCFÞ lVarðCFÞð 1Þ
where U denotes the utility of the uncertain total net cash
flow CF, and E(CF) and Var(CF) are its expected value and
its variance, respectively. The variance of the total net cash
flow reflects the volatility in the total net cash flow, that is,
the volatility that remains after all cash flows of the various
channel contract relationships on the products purchased
and sold have neutralized one another. The parameter l
denotes risk attitude, which is positive (negative) for risk-
averse (-seeking) channel members.
All channel contracts, spot or forward, are eventually (at
time t+1) executed in the spot market. Thus, ultimately, any
channel contract relationship will lead to delivery or accept-
ance in the actual spot market. Hence, the total net cash flow
CF equals the cash flows from the delivery and acceptance
of the products in the spot market at time t+1 plus the cash
flow resulting from forward contract relationships. The total
of products accepted and delivered is denoted by b, which is
the n 1 vector of all products delivered or accepted in the
spot market (by means of spot contracts or forward con-
tracts) at time t+1. For sales, the corresponding element of
b is positive, for purchases, it is negative. The relationship
between sales and purchases may be considered determined
by a fixed-proportions production function, that is, b is
known. The cash flow resulting from forward contract
relationships equals f0 f, where f0 is the n 1 vector of
forward prices at time t (purchases as well as sales) and f the
n 1 vector of forward prices at time t+1. Taking the
transaction costs into account, the net cash flow can be
written as:
CF ¼ a0ðf0   f Þþb
0s  j aj
0TC







A þ a0f0  j aj
0TC ð2Þ
where a is the n 1 vector of the number of forward
contracts relationships. A positive value for an element
indicates a forward contract sales relationship, a negative
value of a stands for a forward contract purchasing
relationship. The variable s is the n 1 vector of cash
flows generated at time t+1 when engaged in spot
contracting relationships, and TC is the n 1 vector of the
transaction costs for forward contracts.
The vectors f and s are uncertain and are modeled by
stochastic vectors with expected values of F and S, respect-
ively. Their joint distribution is assumed to have a cova-
riance and a correlation matrix, written as:
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Kf ¼ diagfs1; ...; snsþnpg
Ks ¼ diagfsd1; ...; sdnsþnpg
where ns is the number of contract relationships that reflect
sales, np is the number of contract relationships that reflect
purchases,  ff is the matrix of covariances between the
forward prices at t+1 (e.g., cash flow resulting from
forward contract relationships),  ss is the matrix of
covariances between the spot prices (e.g., cash flows from
delivery and acceptance of the products in the spot market at
time t+1), Rff is the matrix of correlations between the
forward prices at t+1, Rss is the matrix of correlations
between the spot prices at t+1,  sf is the matrix of
covariances between spot price and forward price at t+1, Rsf
is the matrix of correlations between spot and forward prices
at t+1,si is the standard deviation of the forward price of
product i at t+1, and sdi is the standard deviation of the spot
price of product i.
In line with previous findings in the financial literature,
we assume the joint probability distribution of the cash
flows generated by forward contracts and those generated
by spot contracts to be multivariate Gaussian (Britten-Jones,
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assumed to be completely known at the decision moment,
along with the current forward prices f0, and the vector of
transaction costs TC. This situation occurs frequently in
industrial marketing channels, such as pork and soybeans,
where the traded goods are relatively homogeneous and
where spot markets are available for these goods.
The variance of the channel member’s total net cash flow
is determined by various cash flow relationships between
the products that have been sold (using spot and forward
contracts) and between the products that have been bought
(using spot and forward contracts). This shows that we must
take a multidyadic perspective in order to derive the channel
member’s optimal channel-contracting behavior. The total
net cash flow volatility can be expressed as (The variances
and covariances are conditional on the information set at
time t. In this paper, the time horizon of the cash flows of









¼ a0ð ffa þ 2 fsbÞþb
0 ssb
ð3Þ
The expected utility function (e.g., Eq. (1)) can now be
represented as:
UðaÞ¼a0ðf0   FÞþb
0S  j aj
0TC   la0 ffa
  2lb
0 sfa   lb
0 ssb ð4Þ
The optimal amount of forward contact relationships a
o
should now fulfill the first-order optimality criterion:
raUðaoÞ¼0 () ð f0   FÞ TC   2l ffao 2l fsb
¼ 0 ()  ffao ¼
1
2l
ðf0   F   TCÞ  fsb
ð5Þ
If  ff is assumed to be nonsingular, the optimal amount of






ff ðf0   F   TCÞ   1
ff  fsb ð6Þ
Eq. (6) demonstrates the flexibility and generality of the
model: It considers all purchasing decisions and all sales
decisions simultaneously for both spot and forward contract
relationships. The model’s multichannel dyadic approach to
contracting behavior captures the complexity of interorga-
nizational relations.
Eq. (6) shows that the optimal amount of forward
contract relationships depends on several factors: the chan-
nel member’s risk attitude, the expected cash flow from
forward contract relationships, the cash flow relation among
forward contracts, the expected cash flow from spot contract
relationships, and the cash flow relation among forward and
spot contracts (see Pennings, 2002 for factors that determine
manager’s behavior in initiating a contract in a concrete
choice situation). The first term of Eq. (6) presents a well-
known finding of financial models: an increase of risk
aversion leads to an increase in forward contracting, ceteris
paribus (e.g., Ederington, 1979; Holthausen, 1979; Koski
and Pontiff, 1999; Pennings and Smidts, 2000). The last
term of Eq. (6) shows clear marketing implications: Channel
contract relationships are dynamic, and the whole portfolio
of channel relationships is intertwined through the cash flow
streams involved.
For example, if customers are unwilling to make forward
contracts, and cash flows resulting from sales and purchase
are exactly positively related, then the (risk-averse) channel
member will not use forward contracts with his/her suppli-
ers. After all, the volatility present in the purchasing cash
flows is being neutralized by the volatility in the sales cash
flows, leading to a so-called ‘natural hedge’. (A natural
hedge expresses a condition in which an exposure to a risk
factor is offset or partly offset by an opposite exposure to
that risk factor.) On the other hand, if customers require the
channel member to make forward contracts, then (again
assuming that the purchase and sales cash flows are exactly
positively related) the risk-averse channel member will also
make forward contracts with his/her suppliers in order to
reduce his/her total net cash flow volatility.
The example shows how a multidyadic approach can, in
part, explain dynamic channel contract relationships. These
dynamics are, among others, driven by the interaction
between the upstream contract relationships, between the
downstream relationships, and between upstream and down-
stream contract relationships, as embedded in the various
cash flow relationships between purchases and sales through
both spot and forward contracts, and by the channel mem-
ber’s trade-off between the total net cash flow and volatility,
as embedded in the channel member’s risk attitude. Fur-
thermore, Eq. (6) shows that there might be a benefit of
diversification within a firm, making, for example, vertical
integration less attractive for channel members as a means
of decreasing cash flow volatility. Hence, the last term of
Eq. (6) shows the importance of taking a multichannel
dyadic approach and the influence of contract relationships
with customers on contract relationships with suppliers and
vice versa.
Our model confirms the notion that ‘‘the volatility of
cash flows is reduced when the firm’s relationship with
customers and channel partners is arranged in a manner that
promotes stability in operations. This is, in part, the motiva-
tion for packaged good manufacturers as they attempt to
forge relationships with retailers that create operations that
result in fewer and smaller peaks and valleys in sales’’
(Srivastava et al., 1998, p. 12). That is, channel contract
relationships are market-based assets, as they may lower the
volatility and vulnerability of cash flows. Hence, they are of
great interest to both marketers and financial managers.
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volatility with forward contracts has led several channel
members to act as forward contract service providers. These
channel members have come to serve as cash flow volatility
clearing centers within their respective channels. This
development is most noticeable in commodity channels,
particularly in the raw food marketing channels, such as
pork, soybeans, etc. Often, these forward contract providers
are large firms within the channel, with a big pool of
contract relationships. For these firms, it may be interesting
to take over other the channel members’ cash flow volatility
by offering forward contracts, as this may decrease the
volatility of their own profits. Eq. (3) shows that adding
sales forward contracts to purchasing forward contracts
leads to a decrease in total net cash flow volatility, if the
cash flows resulting from purchasing forward contracts are
positively related with the cash flows resulting from selling
forward contracts. The cash flow volatility generated by
sales and purchases thus neutralize one another, thereby
enhancing shareholder value and overall utility.
Not just firms within the channel offer forward contract
services: Third parties such as banks and exchanges offer
these facilities as well. Among the most notable forward
contract service providers are derivatives exchanges (e.g.,
Chicago Board of Trade and London International Financial
Futures Exchange), which provide standardized forward
contracts (so-called futures contracts), such that channel
members may reduce exposure to cash flow volatility.
In Section 4, we illustrate the properties of our model.
We show how a contract with a downward channel member
influences the channel member’s contract behavior towards
other downstream channel members.
4. Empirical illustration: the meat-marketing channel of
retailers
To show effectively the properties of the model, a volatile
channel context was needed with multiple channel members
at multiple channel levels, as well as a high frequency of
interaction between channel members, resulting in a chain
of contracts. Furthermore, we needed a marketing channel
that met the main assumption of our modeling framework:
The cash flow consequence had to be the most important
dimension of the channel contract relationships. This is
particularly true for commodity marketing channels, where
the commodity features are relatively homogeneous and
pricing is a very important marketing decision (Keith et
al., 1990). The marketing channel of fresh meats was found
to meet these requirements. Retailers buy meat products for
their meat department from wholesalers (meat brokers) and
meat processing plants. In Europe, the meat department of a
retailer accounts for about 7% of the total net cash flow
stream (source: GfK, 2000), showing the importance of this
department. The meat-marketing channels are characterized
by a high frequency of interactions between processing
plants and meat brokers on the one hand and retailers on
the other hand, which result in spot and forward contract
relationships. In this paper, we exclusively focus on the spot
and forward contract purchasing relationships of retailers.
This research design allows us to investigate how the
contract relationships between retailers and their suppliers
interact. Unfortunately, this research design does not allow
us to demonstrate empirically this interaction between both
upstream and downstream channel members (i.e., the inter-
action between the suppliers and the consumers of retailers).
We show how the different channel relationships of retailers
regarding the different meat products interact and how they
change when one channel contract relationship changes.
Furthermore, we come up with the optimal combination of
forward and spot contract channel relationships for retailers
in different European Union countries.
Weekly wholesale spot and forward price data were
gathered on beef, chicken, and pork in France, Germany,
Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom.
Furthermore, we gathered data on the average composition
of the meat department of an average retailer in these six
counties. Data were obtained from the European Commis-
sion, GfK, and the meat product boards in these countries.
The wholesale prices of the three meat components are very
volatile. The coefficient of variation (e.g., the standard
deviation expressed as a fraction of the mean) may be used
to indicate the cash flow volatility in the meat-marketing
channels (Snedecor and Cochran, 1994). Table 1 shows the
coefficients of variation of the different meat products and
the coefficients of variation of the meat departments for the
six countries.
Table 1 shows that the coefficients of variation are
relatively high compared to, for example, US soybeans
(coefficient of variation of 0.14, e.g., Pennings and Wan-
sink, 1999), which is considered as a very volatile market.
Furthermore, Table 1 shows the advantage of taking the
multidyadic channel approach instead of a monodyadic
channel approach (i.e., not accounting for the relationship
between the cash flows of different contract relationships):
The coefficients of variation for the meat departments are
Table 1
Coefficients of variation for single meat products and meat departments in
Europe
a
Beef Chicken Pork Meat department
France 0.178 0.208 0.186 0.107
Germany 0.201 0.068 0.213 0.148
Italy 0.141 0.158 0.165 0.099
The Netherlands 0.149 0.069 0.228 0.127
Spain 0.085 0.142 0.190 0.112
United Kingdom 0.093 0.156 0.194 0.134
a The coefficients of variation of the different meat products are based
on weekly wholesale prices in the six European counties over the period
1990–1999. The coefficients of variation of the meat departments are based
on data on the average composition of the meat department of an average
retailer in thesecounties andthe weeklywholesalepricesin the six European
countries.
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meat products taken together. This is because the cash flows
of the purchase contract relationships for the different meat
products are interrelated.
4.1. Research design and results
Since we wish to evaluate the optimal amount of forward
contract across countries, we have reported the optimal
forward contract ratio, which is the amount of forward
contracts expressed as a fraction of total contract relation-
ships (spot and forward). (The forward contract ratio is that
fraction of the total retail demand for a meat product that is
purchased through forward contracts.) We have calculated
the optimal forward contract ratios for an extremely risk-
averse retailer (in Eq. (6), this means that l!1)i na
particular country using Eq. (6). Furthermore, using Eq. (3),
we have calculated the reduction in cash flow volatility for
the different portfolios of channel contract relationships.
In order to show the benefits of the multidyadic
approach, we first calculated the optimal contract ratios
neglecting the relationships among the three meat products.
The flexibility of the model allows us to calculate the
optimal contract amounts for this situation by simply setting
the covariances between purchasing cash flows to zero in
Eq. (6). Table 2 shows the optimal forward contract ratios
for a retailer that uses only one type of forward contract
(beef, chicken, or pork) to reduce cash flow volatility in the
meat departments.
Table 2 shows that using a forward contract relationship
for a single meat product can contribute significantly to the
reduction of cash flow volatility in the meat department. In
this respect, pork forward contracts outperform the other
two meat forward contracts in all six countries. This is due
to the fact that pork is the largest product in the meat
department in all six countries, except for the United
Kingdom. The value share of pork within retailers’ meat
departments is the highest as well. Furthermore, as was
shown in Table 1, pork exhibits the largest coefficient of
variation in all six countries, except in France.
Table 2 shows that it is not necessary for a retailer to
forward contract all of his or her meat products, as most
optimal forward contract ratios are smaller than 1. Thus, a
portfolio of both spot and forward contract relationships
constitutes the optimum. This is caused by the fact that part
of the cash flow volatility of the single meat products is
offset in the meat department (as shown in the last com-
ponent of Eq. (6)).
Cash flow volatility can be reduced even further if the
retailer uses a combination of forward contracts, instead of
one forward contract relationship for a single meat product
(cf. Table 3). A dramatic reduction in cash flow volatility
can be observed when moving from row 1 in Table 2
(retailers that use beef contracts exclusively) to row 1 in
Table 3 (retailers that use beef and chicken forward con-
tracts simultaneously).
Tables 2 and 3 also show how a change from a spot
contract relationship to a forward contract relationship may
affect the channel contract relationships for the other meat
products, for example, in terms of their forward contract
ratios. The dynamics can be determined using the model as
summarized in Eq. (6). For example, a UK beef forward
contract relationship, complemented by a chicken forward
contract relationship, leads to a decrease in the forward
contract ratio of beef. Advancing from row 1 in Table 2 to
row 1 in Table 3, the forward contract ratio of beef decreases
from 0.434 to 0.337. By adding chicken forward contracts to
the other forward contract relationships, the cash flow
relationships change, and, hence, the optimal forward con-
tract relationships (Eq. (6)), change as well. The forward
contract ratio can also increase: Adding chicken forward
contracts to beef forward contracts leads to an increase in
the forward contract ratio for beef in the Netherlands. These
different results for the United Kingdom and the Nether-
lands can be attributed to the different cash flow relation-
ships between the two meat products. In the United
Kingdom, there is no significant relation between the two
cash flows resulting from forward beef and forward chicken
contracts, whereas in the Netherlands, there is a significant
negative relationship between the two cash flow streams.
Table 2
Retailers’ optimal forward contract ratios: the monodyadic case (not













B 0.218 – – 17.2
C – 0.318 – 29.3
P – – 0.392 47.1
Germany
B 0.109 – – 2.20
C – 1.000 – 49.5
P – – 0.679 94.4
Italy
B 0.231 – – 10.6
C – 0.360 – 27.1
P – – 0.490 73.8
The Netherlands
B 0.110 – – 1.70
C – 1.207 – 44.0
P – 0.548 92.9
Spain
B 0.394 – – 9.10
C – 0.506 – 21.9
P – – 0.643 95.8
United Kingdom
B 0.434 – – 9.30
C – 0.614 – 70.1
P – – 0.512 71.1
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role as well: In the United Kingdom, the value share of
chicken is much larger than in the Netherlands: 41% versus
25%.
The differences among the six countries between forward
contract ratios for different combinations of forward con-
tract relationships are relatively large. They are driven by
the different market structures for each meat product (e.g.,
different cash flow streams, and the relations among them)
on the one hand, and different value shares in the meat
department of retailers on the other hand. These differences
have clear implications for an internationally operating
retailer. The results show that it is not necessarily optimal
for a retailer to have the same contract channel relationship
structures in different regions. In order to optimize share-
holder value, the retailer must take into account the different
drivers of cash flow volatility, which may well result in a
portfolio of contract relationships that differs across regions,
market structures, and consumption patterns. Managing
such complex portfolios of channel contract relationships
is a challenging task. The proposed framework adds struc-
ture to this task and helps channel members optimize their
contract relationships and manage them as market-based
assets, as Srivastava et al. (1998) have suggested.
Furthermore, the model shows how channel contract
relationships with different channel members interact,
thereby explaining the dynamics in channel contract rela-
tionships. For example, if a Spanish retailer uses beef
forward contracts exclusively (Table 2, row 1), (s)he should
purchase 39% of the beef through forward contracts. How-
ever, as soon as this same retailer includes pork forward
contracts (Table 3, row 2), the contract relationship regard-
ing beef must change dramatically to remain optimal: (S)he
should now contract forward only 9% of the total beef
purchases. These changes, when made by a retailer, can
cause tension, frustration, and disagreement in the existing
channel relationship (e.g., Anderson and Narus, 1990; Dant
and Schul, 1992; Frazier and Rody, 1991; Frazier et al.,
1989). Although, in theory, the other channel partner is free
to establish a channel relationship with another party,
switching costs might prevent him/her from doing so (e.g.,
Betancourt and Gautschi, 1998).
Our results show that a channel member must carefully
coordinate all the channel relationships with upstream and
downstream channel members simultaneously. Channel
conflicts caused by disagreement on the channel contract
relationship (spot vs. forward contracting) can be disastrous
to the financial objective of channel members (e.g., enhan-
cing shareholder value). Our findings imply that a conflict
with one channel partner, and, hence, a changing channel
contract relationship with that partner, has great impact on
contract relationships with other channel members as well.
Our model shows that in such an event, the other channel
contract relationships will have to be adjusted, which might
trigger conflicts with other channel members. Hence, the
topic of channel conflict management seems to be important
for channel marketing researchers. Not only does it impact
concepts such as trust and channel interdependence, it also
has a direct effect on the channel member’s financial
performance. In the financial literature, it has been sug-
gested that channel conflicts resulting from incongruent
contract preferences may be resolved by financial facilitat-
ing services that complement the cash flow consequences of
channel contracts (Pennings and Leuthold, 2000).
5. Conclusions and further research
This study shows that the financial objectives targeted by
top management can be transformed into marketing deci-
sions by focusing on the cash flow consequences of con-
tracts (spot vs. forward contract relationships). All channel
contract relationships should be taken into account simulta-
neously when optimizing top management’s financial objec-
tives. That is, any singular channel contract decision must
Table 3
Retailers’ optimal forward contract ratios: the multidyadic case (accounting













B and C 0.228 0.327 – 48.2
B and P 0.307 – 0.462 79.8
C and P – 0.265 0.355 67.1
B, C, and P 0.309 0.266 0.425 100.0
Germany
B and C 0.181 1.000 – 55.4
B and P 0.171 – 0.693 99.7
C and P – 0.101 0.656 94.5
B, C, and P 0.175 1.173 0.654 100.0
Italy
B and C 0.293 0.402 – 43.7
B and P 0.283 – 0.509 89.6
C and P – 0.194 0.440 80.9
B, C, and P 0.313 0.236 0.450 100.0
The Netherlands
B and C 0.268 1.351 – 53.4
B and P 0.211 – 0.565 98.9
C and P – 0.103 0.527 93.0
B, C, and P 0.232 0.253 0.515 100.0
Spain
B and C 0.236 0.449 – 24.9
B and P 0.091 – 0.659 96.2
C and P – 0.202 0.605 99.0
B, C, and P 0.146 0.226 0.628 100.0
United Kingdom
B and C 0.337 0.600 – 75.7
B and P 0.255 – 0.495 74.2
C and P – 0.420 0.354 97.1
B, C, and P 0.243 0.418 0.339 100.0
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contracts already existent with up- and downstream channel
members. Ideally, all contract decisions should be made
simultaneously, as this would enable management to benefit
from the various cash flow relationships among forward and
spot contracts, across sales and purchases. From a descript-
ive perspective, the model shows that changes in channel
contract relationships are driven by channel members’ goals
to optimize the trade-off between the total net cash flow
(which is the result of all channel relationships) and its
volatility, in order to enhance shareholder value. Following
the proposed framework, dynamics in channel contract
relationships are driven, among others, by the interaction
between upstream and downstream contract relationships.
That is, the contract relationship with a downstream channel
member depends, among others, on the contract relation-
ships with upstream channel members, which is caused by
the channel member’s strive for shareholder value, rather
than management of single purchases or sales. The way in
which channel contract dynamics become manifest depends
on the various cash flow relationships between purchases
and sales for both spot and forward contracts, and on the
channel member’s risk attitude.
The aforementioned conclusions are drawn within the
context of our model. The model’s assumes that a channel
member solely aims to maximize his/her risk–return trade-
off, as it is directly related to the creation of shareholder
value, a criterion used more and more by marketing man-
agers and top management. However, we must not forget
that channel contract relationships include other less tan-
gible and measurable concepts like power, commitment,
interdependence, and trust. Although these concepts do not
affect a channel member’s financial performance directly,
they do have indirect influence, because they are the basic
drivers of channel relationships.
The assumption of our model is best illustrated by
commodity channels in which relatively homogeneous
goods are traded and spot prices are available. In this
industrial marketing channel, price is the most important
term of a contract. Hence, the applicability of the proposed
model should be found in this channel domain.
For this reason, the model has been specified in the
context of an industrial (commodity) marketing channel in
which prices are determined by competitive forces, and,
hence, exogenous to the channel member. While this is true
for many industrial marketing channels (especially raw food
marketing channels), it is not for others. In some channels,
the prices are endogenously set by a firm in response to
demand. For our model, this means that not just volatility
but also the cash flow level will have to be taken into
account explicitly. Extending the model in this direction
would be most interesting, as it brings marketing and
finance closer together.
This paper should also be seen as an attempt to integrate
marketing theory and finance by introducing a model that
transforms financial objectives into marketing management
decisions. The important role of financial services offered
by financial institutions (banks and exchanges) in marketing
channel relationships and marketing decisions would be an
interesting avenue to explore, because such efforts would
enhance the integration of finance and marketing.
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